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Abstract
What determines a country's ability to compete in international markets? What
fosters the global competitiveness of its ¯rms? And in the European context, have
key elements of the EU strategy such as EMU and enlargement helped or hindered
domestic ¯rms' competitiveness in local and global markets? We address these
questions by calibrating and simulating a conceptual framework that, based on Melitz
and Ottaviano (2005), predicts that tougher and more transparent international
competition drives less productive ¯rms out the market, thereby increasing average
productivity as well as reducing average prices and mark-ups. The model also predicts
a parallel reduction of price dispersion within sectors. Our conceptual framework
allows us to disentangle the e®ects of technology and freeness of entry from those of
accessibility (i.e. the ease for local ¯rms to reach local and foreign consumers). On
the one hand, by controlling for the impact of trade frictions, we are able to construct
an index of `revealed competitiveness', which would drive the relative performance
of countries in an ideal world in which all faced the same barriers to international
transactions. On the other hand, by focusing on the role of accessibility while keeping
`revealed competitiveness' as given, we are able to evaluate the impacts of EMU and
enlargement on the competitiveness of European ¯rms. We ¯nd that EMU positively
a®ects the competitiveness of ¯rms located in participating economies. Enlargement
has, instead, two contrasting e®ects. It improves the accessibility of EU members but
it also increases substantially the relative importance of unproductive competitors
from Eastern Europe.
JEL Classi¯cation: F12, R13
Keywords: European integration, gains from trade, competitiveness, ¯rm-level data,
total factor productivity5
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Non-Technical Summary
What determines a country's ability to compete in international markets? What fosters
the global competitiveness of its ¯rms? And in the European context, have key elements
of the EU strategy such as EMU and enlargement helped or hindered domestic ¯rms'
competitiveness in local and global markets?
The present paper addresses these questions moving one step further from existing
investigations, which focus on aggregate and sectoral trade °ows in assessing the ex-post
impact of, and bene¯ts from speci¯c economic policies. As pointed out by the so-called
new trade theory, trade °ows are an imperfect measure of the potential impacts on prices
and productivity. With a growing recognition that such price and productivity e®ects can
be uncovered only by complementing country and sector-level information with the ¯rm
level of analysis, the proposed paper takes a fresh look at the data by implementing a
quantitative investigation of the microeconomic e®ects of key elements of the EU strategy
that exploits a wide array of new theoretical and empirical developments that have recently
entered the toolbox of trade economists.
Speci¯cally, a general equilibrium multi-country multi-sector model with imperfectly
competitive heterogeneous ¯rms featuring di®erentiated goods and variable mark-ups is
developed and calibrated. The model, based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), highlights
the interactions between technological leadership, freeness of entry and market accessibility
in determining the competitive environment of a country. Countries exhibiting techno-
logical advantage, freer entry and better accessibility to foreign ¯rms develop a tougher
competitive environment. Moreover, tougher and more transparent international competi-
tion drives less productive ¯rms out of the market while redistributing their market shares
to more productive ¯rms, thereby increasing average productivity as well as reducing aver-
age prices and mark-ups. The model also predicts a parallel reduction of price dispersion
within sectors.
This conceptual framework allows to distinguish the e®ects of technology and freeness
of entry from those of accessibility. In a nutshell, the empirical strategy exploits the fact
that the theoretical model allows to disentangle what a country can potentially do and
what it ends up doing in equilibrium. This becomes clearer when looking for example
at the two extreme situations of autarchy and frictionless trade. In autarchy countries
have to produce everything themselves, so their actual aggregate productivity would be
solely driven by the underlying competitiveness of their own ¯rms. At the other extreme,
with frictionless trade, ¯rms from all countries compete in a single integrated market.
In this situation, only the best ¯rms would survive wherever they are based. Hence a6
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country, whose institutional settings increase the likelihood of domestic ¯rms to be highly
productive, can reasonably expect more of its domestic ¯rms to survive in equilibrium
than a country with institutional settings less supportive of ¯rm productivity. In the real
world of partial trade barriers, the equilibrium outcome will be somewhere in between and
both the above stories will matter.
The model presented in this study and its empirical implementation are meant to
re°ect this fact. On the one hand, by controlling for the impact of international trade
frictions, an index of `revealed competitiveness' can be constructed, which would drive the
relative performance of countries in an ideal world in which all faced the same barriers to
international transactions. On the other hand, by focusing on the role of accessibility while
keeping `revealed competitiveness' as given, the focus can be shifted on the role of those
barriers to evaluate the impacts of speci¯c policies on average ¯rm productivity. In so doing
it is possible to evaluate the impacts of EMU and enlargement on the competitiveness of
European ¯rms.
The study ¯nds that EMU positively a®ects the competitiveness of ¯rms located in
participating economies. In particular, if in 2002 France had been outside EMU, its ¯rms
would have been on average less competitive by up to 7 percentage points while the country
as a whole would have been downgraded of two positions in the European competitiveness
ranking. Adoption of the euro by Great Britain in the same year would have increased
average productivity of British ¯rms by 0.5 to 3 percentage points but its position in the
European competitiveness ranking would have remained una®ected.
Enlargement has, instead, two contrasting e®ects. It improves the accessibility of EU
members but it also increases substantially the relative importance of unproductive com-
petitors from Eastern Europe. Overall, while EMU increases the toughness of competition
in member countries, and through this channel generates lower average (delivered) costs,
markups, prices and quantities, enlargement can be expected to have similar e®ects only
after an increase in the 'revealed competitiveness' of new members that is yet to come.7
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1 Introduction
Globalization has been characterized, inter alia, by the entrance of new players into world
markets. The growing integration of emerging Asia, as well as central and eastern Euro-
pean countries (CEECs), following the collapse of the Soviet Union, is expected to have
lead to a sharpening in the competitive environment and to large changes in the structure
of global trade. Against this changing background, the global economy has enjoyed an
exceptionally rapid pace of growth over the current cycle.1 However, in spite of these
overall results at the world level, globalization has increasingly been associated with con-
cerns, and even fears sometimes. Such concerns might not be completely unjustiﬁed since
globalization is associated with major changes in the structure of production, employment
and trade.
In the face of globalization, some argue that each country left alone could more ﬂexibly
respond to globalization challenges. Others instead support the view that being part of
a larger set of countries, most notably the EU/EMU area, would create more favourable
conditions. Who is right? Why countries - but also regions within countries, workers and
ﬁrms - are variously aﬀected by globalization, and not all of them are necessarily better
oﬀ in the more open global environment? How to assess the stakes of diﬀerent nations as
ﬁltered through the network of domestic and foreign ﬁrms in local and global markets?
Nesting the new trade theory framework originating in the works of Helpman and
Krugman (1985) with the work on ﬁrm heterogeneity developed by Melitz (2003) provides
helpful insights on what determines a country’s ability to compete in international markets,
and on what fosters the global competitiveness of its ﬁrms. It also allows to evaluate if,
in the European context, key elements of the EU strategy such as EMU and enlargement
have helped or hindered domestic ﬁrms’ competitiveness in local and global markets.
By allowing for the joint presence of imperfectly competitive markets, increasing re-
turns and ﬁrm heterogeneity, new trade theories predict that trade and FDI liberalisations
induce not only trade creation but also, and more importantly, a general reallocation of
resources across ﬁrms, countries and regions. Four types of reallocations are privileged by
the most recent literature. First, the selection eﬀect that reallocates resources from the
least to the most productive ﬁrms, not only across industries but also, and more impor-
tantly, within industries. Second, the market size eﬀect which induces a shift of resources
from smaller to larger countries, ﬁrms being attracted by the associated higher market
potential. Third, the higher sourcing from low cost countries. Finally, the reallocation
eﬀects derived from preferential trade agreements, which tend to favour insiders (coun-
tries that are part of them) to the detriment of outsiders. To sum up, the theoretical
expectation is that - in general - liberalization leads to higher welfare for the participant
countries, to degrees variously determined through the channels above. Higher welfare
stems from richer product variety, higher productivity, lower average mark-ups and lower
average prices, reﬂecting a more eﬃcient allocation of resources across ﬁrms, sectors, and
locations.
In order to quantify how these mechanisms concur to determine countries’ performance
in international markets, we calibrate and simulate a multi-country, multi-sector theoreti-
cal framework with monopolistic competition and variable markups in the wake of Melitz
and Ottaviano (2005, Appendix B and C) as extended by Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano
(2006). By merging the insights of traditional trade theory and new trade theory, the
framework highlights the interactions between technological leadership, freeness of entry
1Freeman (2006) reports that after recovering from the ICT bubble, the global economy has expanded
signiﬁcantly above longer-term averages in the past three years, i.e. by about 5% in the period 2004-2006,
1.5 percentage points higher than in 1995-2003.8
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and market accessibility in determining the competitive environment of a country. Coun-
tries exhibiting technological advantage, freer entry and better accessibility to foreign ﬁrms
develop a tougher competitive environment in which ﬁrms are more productive, operate
at a larger scale and earn larger proﬁts while quoting lower prices and lower markups.
Our conceptual framework allows us to disentangle the eﬀects of technology and free-
ness of entry from those of accessibility. In a nutshell, the empirical strategy exploits the
fact that the theoretical model allows one to disentangle what a country can potentially do
and what it ends up doing in equilibrium. To further elaborate on this point, let us look at
the two extreme situations of autarchy and frictionless trade. In autarchy countries have
to produce everything themselves, so their actual aggregate productivity would be solely
driven by the underlying competitiveness of their own ﬁrms. At the other extreme, with
frictionless trade, ﬁrms from all countries compete in a single integrated market. In this
situation, only the best ﬁrms would survive wherever they are based. Hence a country,
whose institutional settings increase the likelihood of domestic ﬁrms to be highly produc-
tive, can reasonably expect more of its domestic ﬁrms to survive in equilibrium than a
country with institutional settings less supportive of ﬁrm productivity. In the real world
of partial trade barriers, the equilibrium outcome will be somewhere in between and both
the above stories will matter. Our model and its empirical implementation are meant to
reﬂect this fact.
On the one hand, by controlling for the impact of international trade frictions, we are
able to construct an index of ‘revealed competitiveness’, which would drive the relative
performance of countries in an ideal world in which all faced the same barriers to inter-
national transactions. On the other hand, by focusing on the role of accessibility while
keeping ‘revealed competitiveness’ as given, we can focus on the role of those barriers to
evaluate the impacts of speciﬁc policies on average ﬁrm productivity. In so doing we are
able to evaluate the impacts of EMU and enlargement on the competitiveness of European
ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd that EMU positively aﬀects the competitiveness of ﬁrms located in partici-
pating economies. In particular, we ﬁnd that, if in 2002 France had been outside EMU,
its ﬁrms would have been on average less competitive of up to 7 percentage points while
the country as a whole would have been downgraded of two positions in the European
competitiveness ranking. Adoption of the euro by Great Britain in the same year would
have increased average productivity of British ﬁrms by 0.5 to 3 percentage points but its
position in the European ranking would have remained unaﬀected.
Enlargement has, instead, two contrasting eﬀects. It improves the accessibility of EU
members but it also increases substantially the relative importance of unproductive com-
petitors from Eastern Europe. Overall, while EMU increases the toughness of competition
in member countries, and through this channel generates lower average (delivered) costs,
markups, prices and quantities, enlargement can be expected to have similar eﬀects only
after an increase in the ’revealed competitiveness’ of new members that is yet to come.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses underlying stylised
facts and background literature to this study. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework
and derives its equilibrium properties. Section 4 calibrates the model to the data. Section
5 discusses the model’s ﬁt to the data. Section 6 simulates alternative macroeconomic
scenarios while section 7 concludes and draws some policy implications.
2 Underlying stylised facts and background literature
Recent analyses of micro-datasets tracking production and international involvement at
the ﬁrm and the plant levels demonstrate that ﬁrms vary tremendously along a number of9
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dimensions even within industries and this plays an important role in aggregate outcomes.
In particular, a hallmark regularity is that ﬁrms serving foreign markets are more pro-
ductive than their purely domestic competitors. Moreover, following trade liberalisations,
the reallocation of productive resources take place not so much across sectors but rather
within sectors. Through this mechanism, the least productive ﬁrms are likely to terminate
production and their market share to be reallocated to more productive foreign and do-
mestic ﬁrms, thus raising aggregate industry level productivity. Furthermore, a country
whose share of exporting ﬁrms increases over time will experience an increase in aggregate
productivity as well as in aggregate competitiveness on international markets. Hence, as
countries open up to trade, the set of ﬁrms that trade and invest abroad changes together
with the set of goods traded and the range of destinations served. As less productive ﬁrms
are competed out of the market, sectoral composition changes and aggregate productivity
increases. This reveals a new source of gains from trade due to tougher competition and
the associated reallocation of resources from less to more eﬃcient ﬁrms.
The above stylized facts have been highlighted by a growing empirical literature. For
example, self-selection into export activities is reported by Bernard and Jensen (1999) as
well as Tybout (2003). The exit of the least productive ﬁrms by Clerides, Lach and Tybout
(1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999) as well as Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000). Market
share reallocation towards the most productive ﬁrms by Pavcnik (2003) as well as Bernard,
Jensen and Schott (2003). The foregoing stylised facts have been explained by recent
developments of new trade theory that show how, in settings allowing for heterogeneous
ﬁrms, international trade integration has a positive impact on aggregate productivity
through the selection of the best ﬁrms (see Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2005). This outcome is due to a combination of
greater import competition and easier market access. While all ﬁrms suﬀer from increased
import competition, those that are productive enough to cover the additional costs of
accessing foreign markets compensate their losses at home with new proﬁts abroad. Firms
that are, instead, not productive enough to serve foreign markets exit or are conﬁned to
withering domestic sales. In the process productive resources reallocate from less to more
productive ﬁrms creating aggregate productivity gains.
In this study, we apply the theoretical framework of Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) to a
quantitative analysis inspired by Bernard et al (2003). Speciﬁcally, as this latter study, we
develop, calibrate and validate a model of many industries and many countries, which we
then use to simulate the eﬀects of counterfactual scenarios reﬂecting key elements of the
EU strategy of deeper and wider regional integration. However, while Bernard et al (2003)
rely on Bertrand market structure, our use of Melitz and Ottavianos (2005) model allows
for a more realistic characterisation of the economy, including the fact that many ﬁrms
operate in a market at each point in time, that more eﬃcient ﬁrms charge higher mark-ups
than less eﬃcient ﬁrms and that the average mark-up falls when there is more competition
in the market. Moreover, while Bernard et al. (2003) use sectoral data as according to the
model used in that study only one ﬁrms is predicted to be active in each market at any
point in time, the fact that many ﬁrms operate in our model allows us to fully exploit the
information of comparable ﬁrm-level data on European countries. A similar methodology
has been used by Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006), who calibrate the model by
Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) to quantify the gains from international trade. We extend
their analysis to the investigation of the eﬀects of deeper and wider EU integration. Note,
ﬁnally, that there are some predecessors to our proposed strategy of using simulations to
calculate the productivity gains from trade in the CGE literature. The closest is Smith and
Venables (1988) who study the eﬀects of the common market when ﬁrms diﬀer in terms
of productivity. However, unlike this type of studies, we derive endogenous productivity10
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distributions through the entry and exit of ﬁrms.
3 Theoretical framework
Our model is based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2005, Appendix B and C) as extended by
Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006). The set-up considers M countries (indexed by
l =1 ,...,M). Labor is the only factor of production and is internationally immobile with
country l hosting Ll units of labor. Each worker supplies one unit of labor inelastically,
so Ll is both the number of workers and the number of consumers residing in country l.
Countries may diﬀer in terms of size, technology and trade barries.
3.1 Demand
Preferences are deﬁned over S + 1 goods. One of them is homogenous while the other S
goods are horizontally diﬀerentiated and we index them by s =1 ,...,S. Each diﬀerentiated
good s comes in a set of varieties Ωs indexed by i ∈ Ωs. Utility is linear in the consumption
of the homogenous good and additive quadratic in the consumption of the diﬀerentiated
goods. This assumption neutralizes the eﬀect of income on demand and allows us to focus
on the consumer surplus only. Speciﬁcally, the preferences of a typical consumer in country




































s(i) represent the individual consumption levels of the numeraire good and
variety i of good s.
Parameters αs, ηs, and γs are all positive and have the following interpretations. The
parameters αs and ηs measure the substitutability between the varieties of good s and
the homogeneous good 0. Larger αs and smaller ηs increase the demand for the diﬀeren-
tiated varieties relative to the numeraire. The parameter γs measure the substitutability
between the varieties of good s. When γs = 0, varieties are perfect substitutes and utility




s(i)di, but not on
its allocation across varieties. Such allocation becomes increasingly important as γs rises,
hence γs is a measure of product diﬀerentiation.
Under the assumption that the typical consumer in country l has positive demand
for the homogeneous good, the maximization of (1) under her budget constraint yields a
















































their average price. Note that a lower average price ¯ pl
s or a larger number of varieties Nl
s
increase the price elasticity of demand and decrease the price bound for positive demand
deﬁned by the right hand side of (4). Hence, falling ¯ pl
s or rising Nl
s lead to a ‘tougher’
competitive environment.11
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3.2 Supply
National labor markets are all perfectly competitive. Perfect competition also characterizes
the market of the homogeneous good. This good is assumed to be freely traded, so its
price is the same everywhere. It is also assumed to be produced in all countries so that,
due to perfect competition, also the wage is the same everywhere. Then, choosing the
homogeneous good as numeraire allows us to pin down the wage to one in all countries.
The diﬀerentiated goods markets are monopolistic competitive and geographically seg-
mented. Entry requires the payment of a sector speciﬁc sunk cost fl
s in units of numeraire,
which is the same for each entrant in sector s. Such cost is associated with R&D activi-
ties that lead to the invention of new varieties whose marketability is ex ante uncertain.
The reason is that an entrant does not know the marginal production cost c of its variety
until its entry cost is sunk. This cost is then determined by a draw from a common and
known distribution Gl
s(c), with support [0,c l
A,s]. The fact that the support varies across
sectors and countries allows us to introduce (probabilistic) ‘comparative advantage’ due













, countries l and h are said to have comparative
advantages in sectors s and r respectively because relative to entrants in h (l), entrants
in l (h) have a ‘better chance’ of getting lower cost draws in sector s than in sector r.
All entrants draw their marginal costs simultaneously. Hence, after their draw, they
can ﬁgure out whether they are productive enough to survive competition. In particular,
given that the entry cost fl
s is sunk, only entrants whose operating proﬁts can cover their
marginal costs choose to stay in the market. Other entrants exit immediately. Survivors
can serve not only the domestic market but also foreign ones. In so doing, they face
however per-unit trade costs. In particular, the overall cost of a delivered unit with cost
c from country h to country l is τhl
s c with τlh
s > 1, where (τhl
s − 1)c is the frictional trade
cost. Such cost should be interpreted in a wide sense as due to all distance-related barriers.
That is why, even within countries, trade may not be costless: τll
s ≥ 1.
Under monopolistic competition, each survivor maximizes proﬁt taking the demand
function (3) into account as well as the average price ¯ pl
s and the number of competitors Nl
s
as given. The proﬁt maximizing price and quantity sold for a ﬁrm in sector s producing






































In these expressions chh
s denotes the upper bound (‘cutoﬀ’) cost inclusive of trade costs
(‘delivered cost’) for ﬁrms selling to country h. It corresponds to the marginal cost of
sellers that just break even: πlh
s (chh
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Sellers with marginal cost c such that τhl
s c = chh
s just break even while ﬁrms with c such
that τhl
s c>c hh
s choose not to sell as they anticipate operating losses. Since the cutoﬀ (8)12
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is the same for sellers from any origin, higher trade barriers from l to h make it harder for
exporters from l to break even as they need better cost draws to do so.
Before entering, ﬁrms are uncertain about their marginal cost. They know, however,
the probability distribution of cost draws and can thus calculate their expected operating
proﬁts from sales to each country. Free entry then implies that the sum of expected
operating proﬁts across all countries exactly match the ﬁxed entry cost:
M  
h=1










Substituting (6) into (9) and solving the resulting system of M equations for l =
1,...,M gives the M cost cutoﬀs. These summarize all the eﬀects of market conditions
relevant for ﬁrm performance. Moreover, substituting (8) into (4) and solving the M

























is the average delivered cost of sellers.
3.3 Equilibrium
Explicit solutions for the equilibrium cutoﬀs can be derived by specifying the distribution
of cost draws Gl
s(c) as a Pareto distribution with upper bound cl









,c ∈ [0,c l
A,s]. (11)
As we will show in the empirical sections, the Pareto assumption allows us to capture in
a simple way one of the key features of the data, namely the skewness of the distribution
of ﬁrms across cost levels. This is captured by the shape parameter ks, which is assumed
to vary across sectors but not across countries. In particular, ks = 1 corresponds to a
uniform cost distribution while increasing ks raises the relative number of high cost ﬁrms
by concentrating more density in the upper part of the support [0,c l
A,s]. As ks approaches
inﬁnity, the distribution becomes degenerate at cl
A,s and ﬁrm heterogeneity vanishes.
In the present setting, another useful property of the Pareto distribution is that any
truncation from above at chh
s /τlh
s <c l
A,s is also a Pareto distribution with shape parameter
ks such that Glh
s (c)=[ c/(chh
s /τlh
s )]ks,c∈ [0,c hh
s /τlh
s ]. Therefore expressions (5)-(8) allow
us to express the average performance variables for sellers in country h as functions of
the cutoﬀ chh
s . In particular, average (delivered) costs, markups, prices, quantities and


































Smaller cutoﬀs are associated with smaller average costs, markups and prices as well
as larger average quantities and proﬁts. A percentage fall in the cutoﬀ chh
s leads
to the same percentage fall in the average cost ch
s (‘selection eﬀect’), in the average13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 847
December 2007
markup ¹h
s (`pro-competitive e®ect') and thus in the average price. Since (12) implies
¹ ph




s=2ks, lower average cost and lower average markup each account for
half of the percentage fall in the average price. Moreover, a percentage fall in the cuto®
leads to ¡(ks + 1) and ¡ks per cent rise in average quantity and average pro¯t respec-
tively. For this reason, the cuto® chh
s can be interpreted as a measure of the equilibrium
`toughness of competition' in country h and sector s.





¢¡ks 2 (0;1] be a measure of the



























is the trade freeness matrix for sector s with determinant jPsj and cofactor
¯ ¯Clh
s
¯ ¯ for its
½lh





















is an index of absolute advantage in sector s. In each sector s the
















h = 1;:::;M; (14)
The fact that chh
s is an increasing function of °s shows that competition is tougher in
sectors in which varieties are less di®erentiated. Cross-country di®erences in the tough-
ness of competition in country h are driven instead by two factors: own country `size'










=jPsj. This sum deserve closer inspection. The ratio Ãl
s=fl
s
measures how easily country l generates ¯rms with high productivity (`good competitors')
and, hence, we call it the `producer competitiveness' of country l in sector s. Since compet-
itiveness depends positively on the absolute advantage Ãl
s and negatively on the entry cost
fl
s, a technologically disadvantaged country with low entry barriers can be as `competitive'
as a technologically advantaged one with high entry barriers. When all countries have the
same competitiveness, Ãl
s=fl








¯=jPsj. This last term measures how di±cult it is for local and foreign
¯rms to reach consumers in country h. It is, therefore, an inverse index of the `accessi-
bility' of country h to ¯rms. Accordingly, in the general case of cross-country di®erences











=jPsj represents an inverse index of the
distance-weighted average competitiveness of countries whose ¯rms sell to country l. We
will refer to it as the inverse index of (average) `seller competitiveness' of country h.
To summarize, expression (14) reveals that competition is tougher in countries bene¯t-
ing from larger local markets and stronger seller competitiveness. Given (12), on average
such countries exhibit lower average (delivered) costs, markups, prices as well as higher
quantities and operating pro¯ts. Note that seller competitiveness and producer compet-
itiveness coincide only when trade barriers are prohibitive. When international trade is14
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feasible, the two concepts may diverge: seller competitiveness in a country with weak pro-
ducer competitiveness can be as high as in a country with strong producer competitiveness
if the former is more accessible than the latter.
Apart from average performance variables, the toughness of competition also deter-
mines the numbers of producers and sellers across countries. Speci¯cally, substituting ch
s










These include domestic producers, whose number is Gh
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E;s, and foreign exporters,
























For h = 1;:::;M the above expression gives a system of M linear equations is that can be




























s ) export to country h. This implies that the number of producers located











Finally, the model generates a simple measure of welfare for each country h. Since
pro¯ts are zero both ex-ante (due to free entry) and ex-post (due to the law of large
numbers), such measure considers only consumer surplus net of the sunk costs of entry.
It is obtained by substituting the quantities that are consumed in equilibrium into utility
(1):
















where 1 is individual income that coincides with the equilibrium wage. According to (18),
the welfare of country l decreases monotonically with its domestic cost cuto®.
4 Calibration
The previous section has presented a theoretical model that determines the economic per-
formance of a country as a function of the toughness of competition in its local markets.
This is inversely measured by the endogenous cost cuto® chh
s and depends on some exoge-
nous parameters capturing both the size and the (seller) competitiveness of the country.
The aim is now to calibrate those parameters to real world data and, after validation, to
use the calibrated model for policy analysis. In particular, we calibrate the model to 12
manufacturing industries operating in 14 European economies in the year 2002.2
2An overview of the data used is available in Appendix 7.15
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All the relevant parameters of the model can be directly observed or estimated except
the ‘revealed (producer) competitiveness’ index ψl
s/fl
s. However, if we assume that the
observed behavior of the economy is well captured by the equilibrium of the theoretical
model, ψl
s/fl
s can be calibrated to ﬁt the observed distribution of productivity across
industries and countries given all other parameters.3
4.1 Trade frictions
We explain the estimation of the parameters of the model starting with the trade freeness
matrix P. This is recovered by exploiting the fact that the theoretical model generates a
‘gravity’ prediction of bilateral exports based on the characteristic of the countries of origin
and destination as well as on their reciprocal distance. To see this, note that in sector




Aggregate bilateral exports EXPhl
s can then be obtained by aggregating rhl
s (c)o v e ra l l
exporters from h to l (with cost c ≤ cll
s/τhl














which is a gravity equation in so far as it determines bilateral exports as a function of
bilateral trade barriers and country characteristics. Note that tougher competition in
the country of destination (lower cll
s) dampens exports by making it harder for potential
exporters to break into that market. Diﬀerently, given (16), tougher competition in the
country of origin (lower chh
s ) promotes exports by increasing the number of entrants into
that market.
Following standard practice, equation (19) can be estimated in logs as
ln(EXPhl
s )=EXh+IMl+δsln(dhl)+βlBorderhl+λLanghlBorderhl+dutime+ hl (20)
where EXh and IMl are dummies speciﬁc to the countries of origin and of destination
respectively, Langhl is a dummy that equals 1 when the two countries share a common
language, dutime is a time dummy, and  hl is the error term. Trade barriers are captured
by two variables. While bilateral distance dhl is used to measure all distance related trade
frictions, the border eﬀect Borderhl targets international trade frictions due to crossing
one or more borders.
In estimating (20), we use data for the years 2000-2003. Although we are interested in
calibrating the model relative to the cross-section of data for the year 2002, extending the
estimates to the interval 2000-2003 increases the statistical robustness of the estimated
coeﬃcients. These are used to calculate industry-exporter-importer speciﬁc trade costs as
ρhl
s = exp(βl − λLanghl)(dhl)δs
. Hence, trade barriers are modeled as a power function of
distance that increases frictional costs when a new border is crossed and reduces them if
countries share a common language. We allow for non-negligible distances within countries
(ρhh
s =( dhh)δs
< 1) and asymmetric trade barriers between countries (ρhl
s  = ρlh
s ).
The results of our estimation across sectors are reported in Figure 1, which ranks
industries by degree of trade freeness, relative to the overall average value.
Table 1 reports the estimated components ρhl
s of the trade freeness matrix. For com-
pleteness, distance coeﬃcients δs are also included. “Printing and Publishing”, “Wood
Products except Furniture” and “Non-metallic Mineral Products” are the least tradable
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Figure 1: Freeness of trade with respect to average, by sector (2000-2003)
Printing and Publishing
Food, Beverages and Tobacco
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Source: Trade and Production database (CEPII), authors’ calculations
industries while “Professional and Scientiﬁc Equipment”, “Textiles, Wearing Apparel,
Leather Products and Footwear” and “Electrical ad non-electrical Machinery” are the
most tradable ones. The table also shows that the ρhl
s ’s are highly correlated with the co-
eﬃcients of distance elasticity δs, which largely explains the variation in tradability across
sectors.
Table 1: Coeﬃcients of freeness of trade and elasticity with respect to distance, by sector
Industry code Industry ρs δs
1 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 6.52E-06 -1.93
2 Textiles,Wearing Apparel, Leather Products and Footwear 3.03E-04 -1.19
3 Wood Products except Furniture 7.02E-06 -1.91
4 Paper products 1.06E-04 -1.38
5 Printing and Publishing 1.12E-06 -2.29
6 Chemicals 6.16E-05 -1.49
7 Rubber and Plastic 1.87E-05 -1.72
8 Non-metallic Mineral Products 9.78E-06 -1.85
9 Metal Products 3.89E-05 -1.57
10 Machinery 3.63E-04 -1.16
11 Professional and Scientiﬁc Equipment 1.37E-04 -1.34
12 Other Manufacturing 2.18E-04 -1.25
Source: Trade and Production Dataset (CEPII) and authors calculations
Turning to the country dimension, table 2 reports the average ρhl
s ’s by countries ranked
from worst to best accessibility. The left hand side of the table shows how easy it is to
access foreign markets from diﬀerent countries of origin (ρout
s ). The right hand side shows,
instead, how easy it is to access diﬀerent domestic markets from abroad (ρin
s ). Unsurpris-
ingly, the ease of accessing foreign market is the highest for the core European countries
and the lowest for peripheral ones. More interestingly, the ease of accessing the domes-17
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tic market from abroad seems to follow a cultural/linguistic divide, with the anglosaxon,
germanic and scandinavian countries being more accessible than the latin/mediterreanean
ones. This conﬁrms that geography is an important determinant of trade costs but other
factors also have a strong inﬂuence.
Table 2: Freeness of trade, by countries of origin and destination
Exporter Importer
ρout
s border eﬀect ρin
s border eﬀect
PT 1.56E-05 -1.29 NO 3.53E-06 -3.12
ES 2.10E-05 -1.23 ES 7.68E-06 -1.96
FI 2.18E-05 -1.28 IT 7.77E-06 -2.09
IT 2.53E-05 -1.22 FR 1.07E-05 -2.17
IE 3.50E-05 -1.31 PT 1.40E-05 -1.16
AT 3.53E-05 -1.28 FI 1.57E-05 -1.30
NO 3.65E-05 -1.14 AT 2.12E-05 -1.37
SE 3.65E-05 -1.29 SE 2.83E-05 -1.17
DK 4.31E-05 -1.35 IE 3.26E-05 -0.92
FR 4.68E-05 -1.22 GB 3.70E-05 -1.11
GB 5.81E-05 -1.30 DE 3.73E-05 -1.22
DE 6.94E-05 -1.29 DK 7.19E-05 -0.41
BE 1.08E-04 -1.38 NL 1.84E-04 -0.01
NL 1.09E-04 -1.38 BE 1.89E-04 -0.01
Source: Trade and Production Dataset (CEPII) and authors calculations
4.2 Production costs
The skewness parameters ks and the cut-oﬀs chh
s can be recovered from estimated ﬁrm-
level TFPs. As to the former, call x =1 /c the TFP of a ﬁrm with marginal cost c and
xl
A,s =1 /cl
A,s the lower bound of its support. If c follows the assumed Pareto distribution




















− ks ln(x). Accordingly, if x is
Pareto distributed with skewness parameter ks and cumulative density function F(x), the
OLS regression of ln[1 − F(x)] on α + β ln(x) consistently estimates ks as −ˆ β with an
R2 close to 1. The results of this regression are shown in Table 3. The R2 is on average
0.8, which indicates that the Pareto is a fairly good approximation of the underlying
productivity distributions. As for the skewness parameter, larger ks implies a larger
share of high cost (low productivity) and therefore small ﬁrms. Hence, ”Metal Products”,
”Rubber and Plastic” as well as ”Machinery” appear to be the sectors with the highest
concentration of ineﬃcient and small ﬁrms, while ”Textiles, Wearing Apparel, Leather
Products and Footwear”, ”Food, Beverages and Tobacco” as well as ”Chemicals” exhibit
the most even distribution of ﬁrms across all levels of productivity and size. Turning to the
cutoﬀ cost, chh
s corresponds to the highest cost (the lowest productivity) of producers in
country h. In principle, the reverse of the minimum observed productivity approximates
well the cutoﬀ cost. However, due to noise and extreme values associated with micro
data, a more robust estimate can be obtained through a moment estimator. Speciﬁcally,
if x is Pareto distributed with shape parameters ks over the support [xhh
s ,∞), then its
mean is equal to xhh
s ks/(ks−1). Using the observed country-sector productivity mean and
the estimated ks, one can invert this formula to recover xhh
s as a scaled average sectoral
productivity. Raising this to the power of −1, generates the cost cutoﬀ chh
s .
By averaging the cost cutoﬀs across sectors within countries, we can get the distribution
of the toughness of competition and hence observed productivity across our European18
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Table 3: Sectoral shape parameters of TFP Pareto distributions, by sector
Industry code Industry ks R2
1 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 1.20 0.79
2 Textiles,Wearing Apparel, Leather Products and Footwear 1.19 0.81
3 Wood Products except Furniture 1.45 0.81
4 Paper products 1.50 0.82
5 Printing and Publishing 1.52 0.83
6 Chemicals 1.32 0.85
7 Rubber and Plastic 1.59 0.78
8 Non-metallic Mineral Products 1.49 0.80
9 Metal Products 1.80 0.78
10 Machinery 1.56 0.77
11 Professional and Scientiﬁc Equipment 1.48 0.75
12 Other Manufacturing 1.46 0.80
Average 1.46 0.80
Source: AMADEUS, Trade and Production database (CEPII) and authors calculations
countries. This is reported in Table 4. The table shows that the most competitive EU














Source: AMADEUS, Trade and Production database (CEPII) and authors calculations
country is Ireland followed by Norway and Denmark. Among large countries the toughest
competitive environment can be found in Germany followed by France.
4.3 Revealed competitiveness
We have now all the information we need to calculate revealed competitiveness ψl
s/fl
s from
(13). In so doing, we proceed in two steps. First, we compute the bundling parameter
ψl
s/(γsfl
s). Then, we remove the sectoral scaling term γs from ψl
s/(γsfl
s) by estimating the
residuals of a regression of lnψl
s/(γsfl
s) on a set of industry dummies. These are reported
in the last column of Table 3. By averaging the regression residuals across sectors, we
obtain our index of revealed (producer) competitiveness.
Table 5 shows the results. According to this table, the most competitive EU coun-
try is Ireland followed by Finland and Denmark. Of the large countries, France is the
most competitive followed by Germany. This remarkably squares with assessments of Eu-
ropean competitiveness based on completely diﬀerent methodologies such as the Global
Competitiveness Index calculated by the World Economic Forum.
The comparison between Tables 4 and 5 reveals substantial rank correlation. Such cor-
relation is, however, far from perfect. For instance, France and Germany switch positions
with Germany ranking higher in terms of toughness of competition, and hence observed19
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Source: AMADEUS, Trade and Production database (CEPII) and authors calculations
productivity, but lower in terms of revealed competitiveness. Accordingly, given diﬀerent
sectoral specialization, size and accessibility, the observed performance of French ﬁrms
with respect to German ones, though worse, can be explained only if France is more likely
to generate more productive ﬁrms. In other words, if Germany had the same specializa-
tion, size and accessibility of France, the observed performance of German ﬁrms would
be worse than French ones. This can be explained in terms of absolute disadvantage or
higher barriers to entry in the case of Germany. Quite remarkable are also the diﬀerent
rankings of Finland and Sweden. These countries face limited accessibility from other Eu-
ropean countries. Accordingly, the observed performance of their ﬁrms can be explained
only through substantial revealed competitiveness. If Finland and Sweden were more ac-
cessible, the observed productivity of their ﬁrms would be much higher. The opposite is
true for Great Britain. Mediterranean countries are, instead, consistently at the bottom
of both rankings.
5 Validation
In order to test the reliability of our calibration, we validate the model by reproducing
other key properties of the distribution of ﬁrm sales and exports. We focus on France, this
choice being dictated by the extensive and high quality coverage of French ﬁrm data as well
as by comparability with existing works such as Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) and
Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2006). French results are also amenable to comparison
with Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) given the similarity of patterns uncovered
in US and French ﬁrm-level data. We target two moments: the share of French ﬁrms that
export and their productivity gap with respect to non-exporters. Data come from the EAE
database compiled by the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) and covering
around 25.000 ﬁrms for the year 2000.
5.1 Share of exporters









s ) export to country h.
Countries that are easier to export to are characterized by larger chh
s /τlh
s . Firms that are
not able to serve the country with the largest chh
s /τlh
s do not export at all. Accordingly,
























s ) gives the percentage of exporters from country l. In the case
of France in 2002, our calibration predicts that 20.8% of French ﬁrms export. Del Gatto,
Mion and Ottaviano (2006) report that in the EAE dataset the real share is 22.26%. This
ﬁgure is also very close to the one reported by Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) in
1986.
5.2 Productivity advantage of exporters
From the calibrated model it is also possible to measure the productivity advantage of
exporters. Our model predicts a 72% productivity advantage of exporters. For the US,
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) report a 33% productivity advantage of ex-
porters over non-exporters. They use this moment to calibrate their productivity variance
parameter θ, obtaining a value of 3.6. This parameter θ is similar to the ks used in this
paper. By rescaling our parameter ks from its current average value of 1.46 to 3.6w e
obtain a 31% productivity advantage. In the EAE database, the productivity advantage
for the year 2000 is slightly above 27% but it is likely to be underestimated as the database
covers only ﬁrms with at least 20 employees, 73% of which are exporters.
6 Simulation
We now turn to simulating how changes in the freeness of trade implied by diﬀerent EMU
membership hypotheses and EU enlargement change average productivity. We consider
two sets of scenarios and quantify the equilibrium chh
s in 14 under the diﬀerent hypotheses.
6.1 EMU
Has EMU aﬀected the toughness of competition in the euro area, and through this channel,
average (delivered) costs, markups prices and quantities? To answer this question, we
simulate the changes in the cost cutoﬀs in two counterfactual scenarios: non-participation
of France to EMU and participation of the UK. In the ﬁrst scenario, we investigate what
would have happened to the productivity of French and other European ﬁrms if France had
not been part of EMU in the period up to 2002. In the second, we study the implications
of Great Britain having joined EMU over the same time frame.
Table 6: EMU eﬀect on trade volumes
(a) (b)
EA11 0.114*** 0.088***
(EMU trade creation eﬀect) (0.025) (0.025)
EA10 0.064*** 0.008
(EMU export boosting eﬀect) (0.023) (0.027)
EA01 0.071*** 0.071***
(EMU import boosting eﬀect) (0.024) (0.025)
Ln (real GDP exporter) 1.214*** 1.194***
0.08 0.08




Data period 1989-2002 1989-2002
Country coverage EU-15+EFTA EU-15
Notes: Robust standard errors; All standard controls, including year, EU membership, nominal exchange rates, and bilateral ﬁxed
eﬀects included in the regression but not reported.
Source: Flam and Nordstrom, 2003. Table 621
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Table 7: Changes in cutoﬀs, by country
eﬀective chh
s counterfactual chh
s % change cutoﬀ counterfactual chh
s with France % change cutoﬀ
with France out of EMU
out of EMU (conservative estimate)
AT 0.1783 0.1781 -0.11 0.1782 -0.07
DE 0.1664 0.1663 -0.04 0.1663 -0.02
DK 0.1375 0.1371 -0.25 0.1373 -0.15
ES 0.284 0.284 -0.01 0.284 0
FI 0.1946 0.1945 -0.03 0.1946 -0.02
FR 0.1724 0.1844 6.97 0.1813 5.15
GB 0.1839 0.1838 -0.06 0.1839 -0.04
IE 0.0457 0.043 -5.85 0.0439 -3.92
IT 0.2335 0.2335 -0.01 0.2335 -0.01
NO 0.1369 0.1361 -0.61 0.1364 -0.32
PT 0.3252 0.3252 -0.01 0.3252 -0.01
SE 0.2471 0.247 -0.04 0.2471 -0.03
eﬀective chh
s counterfactual chh
s % change cutoﬀ counterfactual chh
s with Great % change cutoﬀ
with Great Britain in EMU
Britain in EMU (conservative estimate)
AT 0.1783 0.1783 0.02 0.1783 0.01
DE 0.1664 0.1664 0.01 0.1664 0
DK 0.1375 0.1376 0.09 0.1375 0.04
ES 0.284 0.284 0 0.284 0
FI 0.1946 0.1946 0.01 0.1946 0
FR 0.1724 0.1724 0.02 0.1724 0.01
GB 0.1839 0.1786 -2.89 0.1832 -0.41
IE 0.0457 0.0505 10.48 0.0477 4.41
IT 0.2335 0.2336 0 0.2336 0
NO 0.1369 0.1372 0.22 0.137 0.09
PT 0.3252 0.3252 0 0.3252 0
SE 0.2471 0.2472 0.02 0.2471 0.01
Source: AMADEUS, Trade and Production database (CEPII) and authors calculations
The simulation is carried out by recomputing the components ρlh
s of the trade freeness
matrix in the two cases. We then calculate the new cutoﬀs chh
s corresponding to the
new trade freeness matrices. In so doing, we rely on recent assessments of the impact of
the EMU on bilateral trade ﬂows between European countries. In this respect, the most
careful analysis is arguably presented by Flam and Nordstrom (2003). These authors
measure the eﬀects of the EMU on borders eﬀects by introducing three speciﬁc dummies
in otherwise standard gravity equations. Their ﬁndings are shown in Table 6. The dummy
EA11 equals 1 when both the country of destination and the country of origin use the euro
as national currency. The dummy EA10 takes value 1 when the country of origin uses
the euro whereas the country of destination does not, whereas the dummy EA01 equals 1
when the opposite is true.
The table reports the results for two regressions that give us an upper and a lower
bounds for the eﬀects of EMU on trade ﬂows. Regression (a) considers all Western Euro-
pean countries whereas regression (b) includes only EU-15 members. The observed period
goes from from 1989 to 2002. Comparing the two regressions, the dummy EA11 has an
estimated coeﬃcient that ranges from about 9 to 11 per cent and is statistically signiﬁcant.
Also the coeﬃcient of the dummy EA01 is statistically signiﬁcant and estimated around 7
per cent. Both are statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of the dummy EA10 is instead
signiﬁcant only when all Western European countries are considered with an estimated
value of 6 per cent. It is less than 1 per cent and statistically non signiﬁcant when the
sample is restricted to EU countries only.4
In our ﬁrst counterfactual scenario, we reallocate France from the EMU to the non-
EMU groups of countries and adjust the border eﬀects accordingly using the coeﬃcients of
4A positive EMU eﬀect on trade is a ﬁnding common in the literature. See, e.g., Micco, Stein and
Ordonez (2003) as well as Berger and Nitsch (2005) and Baldwin (2006) for a review of the literature.22
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the dummies estimated by Flam and Nordstrom (2003). In the second scenario, we adopt
the same procedure to reallocate Great Britain from the non-EMU to the EMU groups.
The corresponding results are reported in Table 7.
The upper part of the table refers to the French experiment. It shows that, if France
had been excluded from the EMU in 2002, its ﬁrms would have exhibited an average
productivity of 5 to 6 per cent lower and, in the best case, would have dropped from
ﬁfth to seventh in the European ranking. Accordingly, prices would have been from 5
to 6 per cent higher due to higher average production costs and larger mark-ups. The
reason is that a less competitive French market would have allowed for less resources to
be transferred from less to more eﬃcient ﬁrms. Among the other countries, only Ireland
would have experienced a relevant change in the average productivity of its ﬁrms. This
would have risen by 3 to 5 per cent due to the exit of ineﬃcient ﬁrms in a competitive
environment made tougher by a substantial increase in Ireland’s relative accessibility.
The bottom part of the table regards the British experiment. The adoption of the
euro would have increased the average productivity of British ﬁrms by 0.5 to 3 per cent
with comparable drops in prices and mark-ups. While Great Britain’s position in the
European ranking would have not been aﬀected, the increased exposure to international
competition would have triggered the exit of ineﬃcient ﬁrms. This would have been of
little consequence for the other European countries with the exception of Ireland which
would have experienced a substantial fall in average productivity as well as comparable
increases in prices and mark-ups.
6.2 Enlargement
Let us now turn to the simulation of the changes in average productivity induced by
changes in the freeness of trade associated with two additional scenarios: EU enlargement
(‘wider integration’) and a fully integrated enlarged Europe (‘deeper and wider integra-
tion’). In designing these scenarios, we will play with the border eﬀects as we did in the
previous section.
We start with recalibrating the model on an expanded dataset with 25 rather than 14
European countries.
Table 8: Freeness of trade and distance decay by industry (25 countries)
Industry code Industry ρs ρs
14 countries 25 countries
1 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 6.52E-06 1.32E-05
2 Textiles,Wearing Apparel, Leather Products and Footwear 3.03E-04 2.03E-04
3 Wood Products except Furniture 7.02E-06 3.70E-06
4 Paper products 1.06E-04 2.43E-06
5 Printing and Publishing 1.12E-06 6.10E-07
6 Chemicals 6.16E-05 1.33E-05
7 Rubber and Plastic 1.87E-05 4.30E-06
8 Non-metallic Mineral Products 9.78E-06 2.52E-06
9 Metal Products 3.89E-05 1.76E-05
10 Machinery 3.63E-04 5.54E-05
11 Professional and Scientiﬁc Equipment 1.37E-04 5.02E-05
12 Other Manufacturing 2.18E-04 1.81E-05
Source: Trade and Production Dataset (CEPII) and authors calculations
Table 8 reports the estimated components ρhl
s of the trade freeness matrix for the
enlarged dataset by industry. For the sake of comparison, in the ﬁrst column we report
once more the coeﬃcients ρhl
s from Table 1. With the only exception of “Food, Beverages
and Tobacco”, accessibility is reduced for all sectors, reﬂecting increases in distance and
trade barriers. “Paper products” is the most aﬀected industry while “Textiles,Wearing
Apparel, Leather Products and Footwear” is the least aﬀected one.23
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IS 5.73E-06 UA 1.85E-07
UA 5.93E-06 RO 6.60E-07
PT 6.14E-06 BG 6.78E-07
BG 7.14E-06 NO 6.94E-07
FI 7.62E-06 IS 9.17E-07
ES 8.14E-06 LV 1.35E-06
RO 8.39E-06 ES 1.53E-06
LV 1.05E-05 PT 1.83E-06
IT 1.20E-05 PL 2.06E-06
NO 1.34E-05 IT 2.45E-06
SE 1.37E-05 FR 2.53E-06
HU 1.44E-05 SV 3.27E-06
PL 1.54E-05 FI 3.43E-06
IE 1.60E-05 CZ 4.46E-06
SK 1.76E-05 SE 4.90E-06
SV 1.83E-05 SK 6.17E-06
AT 1.92E-05 IE 8.05E-06
DK 2.15E-05 GB 1.00E-05
CZ 2.19E-05 CH 1.09E-05
FR 2.51E-05 HU 1.22E-05
CH 2.76E-05 AT 1.50E-05
GB 3.29E-05 DE 1.77E-05
DE 3.98E-05 DK 2.23E-05
BE 6.14E-05 NL 1.59E-04
NL 8.15E-05 BE 2.18E-04
Source: Trade and Production Dataset (CEPII) and authors calculations
Turning to the country dimension, Table 9 reports the average ρhl
s ’s for the 25 European
countries under analysis, ranked from worst to best accessibility. Similarly to Table2, the
left hand side shows how easy it is to access foreign markets from diﬀerent countries of
origin as quantiﬁed in the ﬁrst column by ρout
s . The right hand side shows, instead, how
easy it is to access diﬀerent domestic markets from abroad (ρin
s ). The ease of accessing
foreign markets remains highest for core European countries and lowest for peripheral
ones. Nevertheless, the boundaries of the EU core seem to have shifted eastward.
Table 10: Observed productivity, by country
14 Countries 25 Countries
Country chh Country chh
IE 0.05 IE n.a.
NO 0.14 DK 0.15
DK 0.14 DE 0.17
DE 0.17 AT 0.17
FR 0.17 NO 0.17
AT 0.18 FR 0.18
GB 0.18 GB 0.19
FI 0.19 FI 0.20
IT 0.23 IT 0.23
SE 0.25 SE 0.25
ES 0.28 ES 0.28
PT 0.33 PT 0.33
Source: AMADEUS, Trade and Production database (CEPII) and authors calculations
Table 10 shows how changing accessibility as well as the presence of new competitors
from the East aﬀect the toughness of competition across countries. It reports a new ranking
of countries by observed productivity that favors central European countries and leaves
the observed productivity in other areas of the continent unchanged. Unsurprisingly,
also revealed competitiveness ψl
s/fl
s changes. The corresponding values are reported in
Table11.
For some countries (Finland, Germany and Sweden) revealed competitiveness falls24
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Table 11: Revealed competitiveness, by country











IE 2.44 NO 3.80
FI 2.37 FI 2.50
DK 1.81 DK 1.46
AT 1.56 AT 1.40
SE 1.32 SE 1.22
FR 1.20 FR 1.16
DE 1.05 DE 1.02
NL 0.68 IT 0.58
BE 0.57 ES 0.57
IT 0.55 NL 0.51
GB 0.52 GB 0.49
ES 0.52 BE 0.43
PT 0.47 PT 0.42
NO n.a. IE n.a
Source: AMADEUS, Trade and Production database (CEPII) and authors calculations
when we enlarge the dataset from 14 to 25 countries, for others it increases. When the block
of eastern European countries is considered in the analysis, observed ﬁrm performance
and trade ﬂows suggest that the implied ability of countries such as Denmark, Austria,
Germany and Sweden to generate good ﬁrms is someway lower whereas it is higher for the
countries in which revealed competitiveness increases. In other words, neglecting Eastern
markets overplays the competitiveness of the former group of countries and underplays
the competitiveness of the latter.
We now proceed to recompute the trade freeness matrix isolating the impact of EU
membership by introducing corresponding dummies in the gravity equation (20): the
dummy EU00 equals 1 when neither the country of destination nor the country of origin
are EU members in the period 2000-2003; the dummy EU01 takes value 1 when the country
of destination is a EU member whereas the country of origin is not; the dummy EU10
takes value 1 in the opposite case when the country of origin is a EU member whereas
the country of destination is not. As shown in Table 12, all estimated coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant and quite large. Interestingly, being part of the EU favors exports
to non-EU location reducing the border eﬀect by half.




Border eﬀect * EU00 -3.25***
(EU trade diversion eﬀect on bilateral trade between third countries) (0.26)
Border eﬀect * EU01 -3.94***
(EU import diverting eﬀect) (0.06)
Border eﬀect * EU10 0.43***




Country coverage 25 European countries
Source: Authors calculations
Notes: Robust standard errors; Speciﬁcation as in Equation 20, including distance measure, importer, exporter and time dummies.
Coeﬃcients estimated but not reported.
Based on these border eﬀect estimates, we simulate two counterfactual scenarios. In
the ﬁrst scenario, we adjust the border eﬀects to assume that all countries in the dataset
were EU member states in the period of analysis. In the second scenario we eliminate all25
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border eﬀects, imagining an enlarged EU as integrated as if it were a single nation. The
results are interesting. While the elimination of the border eﬀect, beneﬁts all European
countries, and small countries to a larger degree than big countries, this is not the case
for enlargement as all countries experience a loss in productivity.
Table 13: Changes in cutoﬀs from deeper and wider integration, by country
eﬀective chh
s counterfactual chh
s % change counterfactual chh
s % change
with enlargement with no border
AT 0.1707 0.1721 0.83 0.1604 -6.05
DE 0.1423 0.1438 1.05 0.1121 -21.21
DK 0.1327 0.1470 10.75 0.1026 -22.68
ES 0.2829 0.2831 0.08 0.2683 -5.17
FI 0.1946 0.2027 4.17 0.1618 -16.86
FR 0.1593 0.1602 0.55 0.1353 -15.07
GB 0.1786 0.1793 0.40 0.1736 -2.76
IT 0.2328 0.2330 0.11 0.2272 -2.41
NO 0.1401 0.2339 66.99 0.2993 113.71
PT 0.3250 0.3252 0.06 0.3022 -7.01
SE 0.2436 0.2566 5.34 0.2554 4.84
Source: AMADEUS, Trade and Production database (CEPII) and authors calculations
These results can be explained in terms of equation (14). This shows that enlargement
has two eﬀects on the inverse index of (average) ‘seller competitiveness’ of an incumbent
member country h. Recall that such index is an inverse measure of the distance-weighted
average competitiveness of countries whose ﬁrms sell to country h. As such it depends on
the average producer competitiveness of countries selling to h and on the accessibility of
country h. Note also that it does not depend on the size of the integrated market as only
own size Lh matters. Enlargement (lower border eﬀects with respect to the East) has thus
two eﬀects. On the one hand, it improves the accessibility of incumbent EU members, on
the other it increases a lot the relative importance of unproductive competitors from the
East. This latter eﬀect dominates, which reduces seller competitiveness and therefore the
toughness of competition.26
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7 Conclusion and policy implications
Globalization is triggering major changes around the world as countries attempt to reap
the beneﬁts and absorb the costs of associated fast-paced structural changes. Measuring
how countries are faring in this process is increasingly diﬃcult using traditional indicators
of comparative advantages, as the latter cannot account for the underlying heterogeneity
in the competitiveness of domestic ﬁrms and the interactions within the network of local
and global markets. Those questions can be fruitfully addressed by accounting for the
interactions between countries fundamental characteristics, including their market access,
institutional settings, technology and factor endowments, and the eﬀective distribution of
domestic and foreign ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity across sectors and markets.
To this end, this paper proposes a new conceptual framework of analysis, which merges
the insights of traditional trade theory and new trade theory in a multi-country, multi-
sector model with monopolistic competition and variable markups. As a result, an innova-
tive indicator of ‘revealed competitiveness’ is presented. This latter is empirically derived
by calibrating the model on ﬁrm level data and industry level trade ﬁgures from a large
panel of European countries. The indicator is then used to provide a ranking of European
countries which remarkably squares with assessments of European competitiveness based
on completely diﬀerent methodologies such as the Global Competitiveness Index of the
World Economic Forum.
The calibrated model is further exploited to investigate whether key elements of the
EU strategy, namely EMU and enlargement are helping or hindering the eﬀorts of Europe
to adapt to the challenges of a more competitive global environment. The results indicate
that outside EMU, less ﬁrms would be able to survive competition on domestic and foreign
markets. In particular, in the absence of EMU, a country’s accessibility is lower and its
share of unproductive ﬁrms higher. The quantiﬁcation of these eﬀects shows, however,
that the eﬀect is uneven across countries.
Enlargement has on the other hand two contrasting eﬀects. On the one hand, it
improves the accessibility of EU members, on the other it increases substantially the
relative importance of unproductive competitors from the East. Overall, while EMU has
increased the toughness of competition in Euro area countries, and through this channel
lowered average (delivered) costs, markups, prices and quantities, enlargement can be
expected to have similar eﬀects only with an increase in average productivity in the new
EU members.
All in all, four critical channels have been explicitly considered in the model - in line
with new trade theories - as critical sources of a country’s overall competitiveness. The ﬁrst
is accessibility. Regions with overall better access tend to be associated - ceteris paribus -
with tougher competition, richer product variety, and higher productivity. These regions
are indeed also better export-bases and therefore attract a greater amount of ﬁrms from
neighbouring countries. The second important channel is market size. In a world embody-
ing economies of scale, larger and more integrated markets are characterized by tougher
competition, lower mark-ups and lower prices. EMU and EU enlargement have arguably
implied the creation of a larger and more accessible domestic market, hence helping Euro-
pean ﬁrms to cope better with the structural changes associated with globalization than
ﬁrms in the previous collection of smaller and less integrated national markets. The third
channel is Ricardian technological advantage. Technologically advanced regions are as-
sociated with higher productivity level and tougher competition. Again, this generates
higher product variety, lower prices and higher welfare. Finally, the last channel is the
institutional and political framework, since the quality and resilience of the domestic in-
stitutions are key elements of success amid global competition. These two last channels
are synthesised in the proposed indicator of ‘revealed competitiveness’.27
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Though stylized this analysis bears two main policy implications for the euro area
and other EU countries. First, in order to take full advantage of the positive eﬀects
of globalization - which are mostly related to increased accessibility to foreign markets
and enhanced eﬃciency of the domestic markets - a continuation of structural reforms in
euro area and other EU countries appears beneﬁcial in enhancing their ability to adjust
to major changes taking place in the global environment. In particular, implementing
structural reforms which are beneﬁcial for growth and innovation seems to be paramount.
The success of the implementation of such reforms partly hinges on an important link
between innovation, growth and reforms and, for the speciﬁc situation in the EU, the
interaction between EU and national policies. At the same time, policies should aim at
raising ﬂexibility and lower the adjustment costs for domestic ﬁrms and workers facing
the challenges of a globalisation process that they cannot control.
Second, while the euro has provided participating countries with a strong currency, a
credible monetary policy and - together with other EU key strategies such as the Single
Market Programme and enlargement - a better export base, it has also increased the need
for cooperation and coordination of economic policies among member states leading to
Europe-wide structural reforms. In particular, our model suggests that policies able to
improve market access are likely to be associated with broad competitive gains.
All in all, as globalisation is triggering major transformations all over the world, the
analysis supports the view that the adoption of a common currency and the deepening
of EU integration would have contributed to make member countries more competitive
but that the strategy of broadening the EU borders needs to be accompanied by further
adjustments to boost competitiveness further.28
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Data Appendix
The data we use to compute trade costs are provided by a combination of sources.
A Trade ﬂows and production data
Data on Trade ﬁgures and production are from the combined CEPII(BACI)-World Bank
dataset described in Mayer and Zignago (2003) and freely downloadable at www.cepii.fr.
These data together allow us to recover both the intra-national ﬂows (EXPhh
s ) and the
external ﬂows (EXPlh
s , with o  = h) ﬂows of goods. To recover the bilateral trade costs
for the countries under analysis, we consider trade among 32 European countries in the
years from 1999 to 2003. We use a larger number of countries and years to obtain more
accurate measures.
B Population and geographical data
Data on population (thousand of inhabitants) are from the World Development Indicators.
Geographical data are from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Inter-
nationales (CEPII). The distance variables are in km and cover both simple and weighted
measures. In this analysis we use weighted distance but we also checked the consistency
of results for the simple distance. Simple (geodestic) distances are calculated follow-
ing the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important
cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) for the ”dist” variable and the geographic
coordinates of the capital cities for the ”distcap” variable. Both variables incorporate
internal distances that, as in the theoretical model, are allowed to be non-zero. As in
Head and Mayer (2002, 2004), the internal distance dhh of country h is calculated ﬁrm its
area as dhh = 2
3 ×
 
areah/π. This formula models the average distance between producer
and consumer on a stylised geography where all producers are centrally located and the
consumers uniformly distributed across a disk-shaped region.
By contrast, weighted distances use city-level data on distance and the geographic
distribution of population inside each nation. The basic idea is to calculate the distance
between two countries as the weighted average bilateral distance between their biggest
cities with the corresponding weights determined by the shares of those cities in the overall
national populations. This procedure can be used in a totally consistent way for national
and international distances. Speciﬁcally as Head and Mayer (2002) indicate: the distance
















poph designate the populations of agglomerate p in country l and of
agglomerate r in country l, respectively. The parameter θ measures the sensitivity of
trade ﬂows to bilateral distance dpr. For the distw variable, θ is set equal to 1, while for
the distwces variable, θ is set equal to −1, which corresponds to the standard distance
coeﬃcient estimated from gravity equations.30
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C Firm Level Data
This paper retrieves data on value added, ﬁxed assets (capital), sales and the cost of mate-
rials (intermediate consumption) in thousand of euros as well as the number of employees
from a large cross section of manufacturing ﬁrms from 25 European countries.
Table 14 shows number of ﬁrms and their average, minimum and maximum values for
total factor productivity.
Table 14: Firms, by country
Country Firms TFP (OLS Method)
Average Standard Deviation Min Max
AT 105 33.32094 26.39095 2.212487 193.4029
BE 2567 29.07782 48.90826 1.63548 2192.651
BG 1075 3.478918 6.956333 .0213871 129.778
CZ 2365 8.811675 7.5188 .3352955 105.8155
DE 278 39.31219 35.05724 .4000357 329.0522
DK 651 38.52366 34.14457 1.298811 361.1505
ES 57023 15.13584 10.98763 .1211805 182.9147
FI 5171 22.9919 26.79103 .4409083 1317.939
FR 32858 27.96352 17.82251 .969883 272.4582
GB 6615 27.24272 46.74277 .075911 2017.521
HU 94 9.751219 8.597522 1.465112 55.74363
IE 72 34.53856 114.58916 .3239747 2110.6823
IT 8542 20.79159 15.36606 .2417498 265.8112
LV 34 4.933191 2.765409 1.359142 15.1516
NL 410 44.68786 123.4879 .119943 2201.635
NO 3652 30.18319 26.15541 .5131263 299.1277
PL 2303 7.783876 7.787789 .0400448 118.2887
PT 355 12.88198 10.9181 .2936199 122.3479
RO 8533 2.376443 2.393516 .0511188 64.61783
SE 14621 18.3754 11.39272 .2973468 155.7835
SK 38 11.06216 19.38057 .4526804 109.7441
UA 1991 1.834839 1.710435 .0160045 21.85019
Total 149353 19.03911 20.87742 .0160045 2201.635
Source: Amadeus
The data are from the Amadeus database(Bureau van Dijk, BvD)5 We eliminate miss-
ing values and extreme observations deﬁned as having either a value added/employee or
capital/employee ratio out of the range identiﬁed by the 1st and 99th percentile. This
leaves us with an initial sample of 149,353 ﬁrms. As we can see from the table, data
coverage for some countries including Germany is rather poor. This is a shortcoming as
Germany is the biggest European economy as well as among the most productive. We use
these data to estimate ﬁrm-level total factor productivity.
Turning to the industry disaggregation we work with a 12 sectors breakdown of
manufacturing activities, which is derived from merging the information contained in
AMADEUS, classiﬁed in 4-digit NACE sectors with the database needed to compute
5Amadeus provides comparable ﬁrm-level balance-sheet data for 4 million companies in 34 European
countries at the 4-digit NACE sectoral detail and covers all industries with exception of the bank and
insurance sectors. Amadeus gathers information on ﬁrms that satisfy country speciﬁc size-thresholds. By
construction, the database is biased towards large companies. A further shortcoming of the data is that
statutory reporting and ﬁling requirements diﬀer from country to country, and the amount of balance sheet
information required by each country varies correspondingly, so that the data coverage is very unbalanced.
Also Amadeus, to date, is less complete in countries where there is a lack of centralisation, with companies
registering at oﬃces based in their region rather than at a single registry. This is a problem in particular
for Germany where, furthermore, value added data is available only for a small subset of companies.31
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trade costs, organised by 3-digit ISIC sectors. The resulting disaggregation is detailed in
Table 15.
Table 15: Representativeness of the AMADEUS sample
Own industry code Industry description
1 Food, beverages and tobacco
2 Textiles, Wearing apparel and footwear
3 Wood products except furniture
4 Paper products
5 Printing and publishing
6 Chemicals
7 Rubber and Plastics
8 Non-metallic mineral products
9 Metal products
10 Machinery except electrical
11 Professional and scientiﬁc equipment
12 Other manufacturing and transport equipment32
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